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1 Introduction
The last decade, more industrialized countries and international organizations have shown
interest in different types of government intervention in the market for child care. Among
these is the OECD, who has covered the introduction of early childhood intervention
programs in their member states in several reports (OECD, 2006; Field, Kiczera, and
Pont, 2007). In his most recent State of the Union address, President Obama proposed to
make “high-quality preschool available to every single child in America” (Obama, 2013),
and similar moves towards child care reform have been made in Germany and other
European countries.
Such interventions are usually claimed to have at least one of three effects. First, they
are said to affect fertility and combat low fertility. Economists have documented a negative
relationship between income and fertility (Jones, Schoonbroodt, and Tertilt, 2010; Jones
and Tertilt, 2006), and high-income countries like Germany have seen universal subsidized
child care as a tool for increasing below-reproduction fertility. Second, universal child
care is said to benefit child development and equalize differences in initial endowments.
Although the evidence on the effects of child care on development is inconclusive, some
economists have suggested to use early child care intervention as a cost-efficient way to
combat social reproduction (Currie, 2001). Last, and most importantly for this thesis,
universal child care is claimed to be an efficient tool for increasing female labor force
participation by reconciling work and family responsibilities (OECD, 2006).
In Norway, female labor force participation and gender equality in the labor market
is an important goal for the universal child care system and welfare state in general. The
government has a clear goal of full child care coverage, claiming among other things that
universal child care is “central to parents’ labor market inclusion” (Kunnskapsdeparte-
mentet, 2007-2008). Subsidized, universal child care has been an integral part of the
Norwegian and Nordic welfare states since the second World War, and so these countries
provide natural cases for evaluating the efficiency of such measures. Until recently, how-
ever, the availability of such child care has been more or less restricted to preschoolers,
children of 3 to 6 years. Several scholars have evaluated the effect on labor supply of child
care for these children, among them Havnes and Mogstad (2011) using a 1975 reform.
For younger children such research is scarce. There are several reasons to believe that
the labor market response of mothers of toddlers (1- and 2-year olds) differ from mothers
of older children. For one, the alternative mode of care may differ: If formal child care is
not available, mothers of toddlers might take care of the children themselves while mothers
of preschoolers find informal solutions enabling them to work. Second, the preferences
of the mothers might differ so that they are more or less responsive to the availability of
care.
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the third claimed effect of child care: Is
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universal child care an efficient tool for increasing the labor force participation of mothers
of toddlers?
To investigate causal effects, we need a valid estimation strategy that can disentangle
causality from correlation. Simply comparing the labor supply of mothers in municipalities
with high child care coverage to that of mothers in low coverage municipalities is not likely
to yield unbiased estimates of the true effects.
A reform from 2003 leading to large increases in child care for toddlers in Norway
provides a natural way to evaluate the impact of toddler care. The reform increased gov-
ernment subsidies to investment in and running of child care institutions, and generated
large variation in expansion rates between municipalities and over time. This variation
provide a unique possibility to evaluate the effects of toddler care, and as will be shown,
there are reason to believe that the changes in child care coverage following the reform
can be regarded as exogenous.
To solve the unobserved heterogeneity problem, we make use of high quality Norwegian
registry data in a fixed effects method, explaining changes in labor supply by changes in
child care coverage. As long as the composition of unobserved determinants of labor supply
is constant, this approach will control for them. Since the main regression uses fixed effects
at the municipality level, we also control for a range of individual characteristics that might
affect labor supply decisions. These include education of the parents, immigrant status,
household characteristics, age and family structure.
In a non-rationed market, changes in both demand and supply will affect the observed
coverage rates and we might worry for reverse causality: That increases labor supply lead
to increases in coverage rates, rather than the opposite. As will be argued, the child care
market following the reform is severely rationed. In a rationed market, the observed child
care coverage rates will be driven by changes in supply only until the rationing is lifted.
The rationing in the child care market therefore strengthens our empirical approach and
reduces problems of reverse causality.
Using this method, we find that a full scale expansion of child care for toddlers will
lead to an 11 percentage point increase in the share of working toddler mothers. This
constitutes around 16% increased participation compared to the mean over the period.
For full-time employment, the effects are smaller at around 5 percentage points or 13%
increase in mothers working full time. These effects are significantly different from zero
at any conventional significance level.
We also find some evidence of persistency in the labor supply response, indicating that
child care for toddlers have effects on labor supply that last several years after the toddler
period. This improves the cost efficiency of the reform as it increases the tax base over
several years.
We also find slight evidence of a reverse response to child care among fathers: Fathers
seem to reduce their labor supply as a response to increased child care coverage, or possibly
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increasing labor supply when child care is not available to support a mother not working.
Although these estimates are imprecise, the effect of this is to lower the cost efficiency of
the reform.
These estimates are larger than other estimates in the literature, particularly Havnes
and Mogstad (2011), who find effects around half the size for mothers of 3- to 6-year
olds following a similar reform in 1975. Although preferences of mothers of older children
might be different and preferences may also change over the three decades between the two
reforms, our main explanation of this difference is that the alternative mode of care for
toddlers and preschoolers differ. The results from this thesis indicate that the alternative
mode of care for toddlers when formal care is not available to a larger extent is parental
care than informal care such as relatives or unregistered child minders. This makes a
child care reform for toddlers more efficient than for other children when considering the
effect on female labor supply only.
Although a cost-benefit analysis of the child care reform is not the purpose of this
thesis, the economic implication of these results is that the government must construct
around 9 slots in child care to induce one more mother to enter the labor market. These
slots are costly, considering the large government subsidies involved, and these are not
covered by the increased tax income from one more working mother.
We might worry that our results are driven by self-selection into or out of treatment.
This can happen if work-prone mothers migrate into or out of municipalities with large
expansion of child care. If there is selective migration, the effects we have found might
simply be the result of mothers interesting in working more sorting into municipalities
with high expansion. To investigate this, we perform several robustness tests where this
sort of selective migration is ruled out, and find that the results are stable to these tests.
Our approach is based on an assumption that is very similar to the common trend
assumption of Difference in Differences setups: Conditional on the control variables and
with no changes in child care coverage, the municipalities would follow a common trend
in labor supply. To test this assumption, we perform two tests where we relax this
assumption using separate time trends for each municipality and time shocks that vary
by municipality characteristics. These tests also support our approach.
We last perform an overall placebo test explaining the labor supply of mothers of
older children by the child care coverage rate for toddlers. This should not have any
explanatory power, as these mothers no longer have toddlers. If they do, we would worry
for misspecification of our model. This test shows little evidence of misspecification.
These and more robustness tests lend support to our empirical approach, indicating that
we have identified a causal effect of child care on female labor supply.
The results from this analysis are highly relevant to current political debates in Nor-
way, considering that the demand for child care for older children is more or less covered.
The findings in this thesis therefore speak to the efficiency of further expansion. They
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will also provide evidence for other countries and governments considering a move towards
universally accessible, subsidized child care for young children. Universal child care ex-
pansion for toddlers are not necessarily money for nothing as Havnes and Mogstad (2011)
find, but still a rather cost-inefficient way to increase female labor force participation.
This thesis progresses as follows: Section 2 presents an overview of the most important
empirical evidence evaluating the effect of child care availability and prices on female labor
supply. Section 3 presents the child care reform of 2003 and the institutional setting and
discusses the system for distribution of child care in a rationed market. Section 4 presents
existing theory on labor supply for mothers and develops a model of child care more suited
to a rationed formal market.
Section 5 presents the data and the construction of the sample, while section 6 presents
the empirical strategy and performs a preliminary analysis of the exogeneity of the expan-
sion. Section 7 presents the results of the main specification, several subsample analyses
and discusses and tests for a range of possible problem for the identification, while section
8 concludes.1
2 Literature
The determinants of female labor supply have attracted considerable interest in economic
literature. We therefore start by reviewing notable contributions to the literature inves-
tigating the effects of subsidized child care on female labor supply.
Blau and Currie (2006) review more than 20 studies on the labor market elasticities
with regards to prices of child care. They report estimates of elasticities ranging from
0.06 to -3.60. This means that we should expect a -.06 % to 3.6% increase in labor supply
if the price of child care is lowered by 1%. According to the authors, most of the variation
in these estimates comes from the different empirical strategies used, not from variation
in samples or data sources. Therefore, it is important to thoroughly examine the different
empirical strategies.
A strand of the literature (Anderson and Levine, 1999; Blau and Robins, 1991; Con-
nelly, 1992; Connelly and Kimmel, 2003; Han and Waldfogel, 2001; Kimmel, 1998; Powell,
1997; Ribar, 1992) use discrete choice models to explain the extensive work decision of
mothers. They account for selection effects into employment, for example with the two-
stage process suggested by Heckman (1979). Baum (2002) uses a discrete time logistic
hazard rate model to explain the timing of return to work after birth. As explanatory
variable, these studies use child care expenditure data from surveys to measure child care
costs and explain variation in employment. The studies using this approach yield elastic-
ities between .04 and -1.26, but as Blau and Currie (2006) note, the methodology used
1All statistical analyses have been performed using Stata version 12.
4
can be problematic for two reasons: First, it is bivariate, and does not properly take into
account the substitution to formal care among already working mothers.
Second, the variation in child care prices that they exploit might not be exogenous.
Most of these studies use average child care expenditure data per hour of care, but these
prices are calculated as average expenditures over all mothers who work, also those who
use unpaid care and therefore spend less on child care. The measurement error in child
care prices might therefore give rise to bias in the estimates. As in other selection model
studies, they also rely on exclusion restrictions, variables that can explain the employment
decision, but does not have an effect on the use of child care, and if these are not valid,
the estimates will be biased.
Tekin (2007), Blau and Hagy (1998) and Ribar (1995) study the same problem, but
take into account the joint decisions of labor supply and child care. Ribar (1995) use a
structural multinomial choice model to explain married women’s child care and employ-
ment decisions, and treats the price of child care as a variable that affects the underlying
utility of the choices involving formal care. He splits the employment choice into not
working, working part time and working full time, and the child care mode into formal or
informal care. He then estimates a multinomial choice model with five possible choices,
assuming that a mother who does not work takes care of her child herself and that no
mother combine formal and informal care. He finds a price elasticity of -.088 for women
with children under 6 years old, indicating a relatively small labor supply response to price
reductions in child care. Tekin (2007) uses a similar multinomial choice model on single
mothers, and finds a price elasticity of -.12. Blau and Hagy (1998) also model the joint
choice of labor supply and mode of care, but use data on prices from a survey of prices
in day care centers. Their estimate is -.20. The three studies which most thoroughly deal
with employment and mode of care as joint decisions thus all fall in the lower end of the
studies reviewed in Blau and Currie (2006).
The above mentioned studies do to a limited degree account for selection effects.
Another strand of research uses various quasi-experimental approaches to try to control
for the selection problem. Baker, Gruber, and Milligan (2008) study the introduction of
a universal, subsidized child care system in Quebec in the late 90’s that open for other
identification strategies to the effect of subsidized child care. They use a cross section
survey among families in a Difference in Differences setup to evaluate the effect of child
care prices on extensive and intensive labor supply. The control group is the rest of
Canada, and as in all DiD-setups, their crucial assumption is that Quebec would have
experienced a similar trend in labor supply as the rest of Canada in the absence of the
policy change. They find a price elasticity of -.236, but also that around one third of the
new formal child care users were mothers who were previously working and relying on
informal care arrangements.
Gelbach (2002) investigates the effect of a universal intervention that made free public
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preschool available for all five year olds. He uses quarter of birth as an instrumental
variable for preschool usage, and finds sizable effects of the subsidy on a range of measures
of maternal labor supply.
Lundin, Mörk, and Öckert (2008) use a Swedish reform from 2002 that introduced
a maximum price for full time child care to study the effect of reduced prices on labor
participation when initial participation is high. They exploit survey and register data
on municipal child care prices before and after the reform and household characteristics,
and use a difference-in-difference matching estimator. They compare households which
are identical with respect to a range of household characteristics before and after the
reform, but who reside in different municipalities and thus are subject to different price
changes. Their approach yield small and insignificant results of the price reduction, and
they conclude that further reductions of prices in countries with high initial female labor
participation will have limited effect.
Hardoy and Schøne (2010) evaluate the labor market effect of a similar max price
reform in Norway in 2006. The reform reduced the maximum price for a full time slot in
child care to 2,250 NOK per month, and Hardoy and Schøne argues that this introduced
exogenous variation in the price, as municipalities with higher initial prices had to reduce
the prices more to meet the max price cap.2 They use a triple difference approach, and
start by comparing the change in labor supply for mothers giving birth in 2005 and affected
by the reform to the change in labor supply for mothers giving birth in 2001, not affected
by the reform. To account for contemporaneous macroeconomic shocks during this period,
they also compare this change to the change in the labor supply of mothers with older
children that are not eligible for the max price guarantee. Using this triple difference
approach, they find that the average price reduction of 400 to 500 NOK increased labor
supply by 3 to 4 percentage points along the extensive margin, or around 5 per cent. They
find no evidence of response on the intensive margin.
Using a similar method, Schøne (2004) studies the introduction of the cash-for-care
(CFC) system that introduced cash transfers to mothers opting out of the formal market.
Using the same triple difference estimator as above, he finds a 4% reduction in female
labor supply as a result of the cash for care system. This is evidence that mothers are
sensitive to the price of the outside option of caring for the children themselves.
Drange and Rege (2012) study the same reform to evaluate long term labor supply
responses. They use a difference-in-difference approach with mothers of older children as
the control group. They find significant negative effects on maternal labor supply, also
after the child is no longer eligible for the transfer. The effects on labor force participation
and earnings persist until the child is around 6 years old. Rønsen (2000) studies the CFC
2This assumption could of course be questioned - municipalities with higher initial child care prices
may have this for example because the parents are richer or willing to pay more, casting doubt on the
common trend assumption of the DiD-approach.
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reform using a multinomial logit model that takes the different modes of care into account.
She compares the estimates of the probabilities of making the different choices before and
after the reform, and finds small, but significant labor supply reductions for most women
and increased use of non-formal care.
The main inspiration for this thesis is Havnes and Mogstad (2011), who use the vari-
ation in child care availability stemming from the child care reform in 1975 to estimate
the labor supply response of mothers of 3- to 6-year olds. The reform led to a large-
scale expansion of child care by subsidizing the construction and running of child care
institutions, similar to the reform under study in this thesis. Havnes and Mogstad split
the municipalities in two groups. The municipalities with above median percentage point
growth in child care coverage from 1976 to 1979 constitute the treatment group, while
the below median growth municipalities constitute the control group. They then use a
Difference in Difference approach and compare the change labor supply for women in the
treatment municipalities to the change in labor supply for women in the control munic-
ipalities. They find significant, but small effects of the child care expansion on female
labor supply. Out of the approximately 17,500 more child care slots constructed in the
treatment municipalities compared to the comparison municipalities, only 640 women
were induced to start working. Their conclusion is that the expansion primarily crowded
out informal care arrangements. In the empirical part of this thesis, this relationship will
be investigated also for younger children in the 2000’s using a similar child care reform.
3 Institutional setting and the child care reform
The Norwegian child care system has its roots back to the 19th century, with child care
asylums for children of the poor appearing in several Norwegian cities as early as the
1830’s.3 The system of universal child care as we know it was developed after the second
World War as a response to the increasing female labor force participation and the goal
of gender equality in the Nordic welfare model (The Norwegian Ministry of Children and
Family Affairs, 1998). The demand for child care led to increased rationing of formal care
in the 60’s and 70’s, eventually leading to the Kindergarten Act of 1975, a broad agreement
aiming to increase the provision of universal child care (Havnes and Mogstad, 2011). The
goal of the reform was to strengthen and secure child development and stimulate the
municipalities to expand child care coverage. This reform introduced large subsidies for
child care expansion, and eventually led to large increases in the coverage rates for 3-6
year olds.
The younger children, however, were not subject to the same expansion of child care
coverage as a result of the first Kindergarten Act. The increase in the coverage rates
for toddlers and preschoolers is pictured in figure 1. In 2001, 80% of the 3-5 year olds
3See the appendix of Stortingsmelding nr. 41 (2008-2009) for a thorough treatment.
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Figure 1: Child care coverage rates in Norway, 1972-2012
Source: Statistics Norway.
in Norway were in formal child care, while only 37% of the 1- and 2-year olds were the
same. This was the background for the kindergarten concord,4 a reform that led to large
increases in child care for young children that will be exploited in this thesis.
On June 11th 2002, a majority of the Norwegian Parliament agreed on the main
principles for financing and governing the child care sector. The government was asked to
present specific plans for how to carry out the agreement. These plans were put forward
in Stortingsmelding nr. 24 (2002-2003), a plan for financial and legal changes in the child
care sector, with broad bipartisan support. The main goals of the concord was to supply
universal child care to all children, provide equal treatment of public and private suppliers
of child care, lower parental fees and secure quality and diversity in child care services.
The most important means for obtaining these goals were a legal obligation for the mu-
nicipalities to supply child care, equal eligibility for subsidies for private and public child
care institutions, increased subsidies, a specific investment subsidy to encourage the con-
struction of new child care institutions and simplifications of the rules for kindergartens,
aiming at making it easier to start and run kindergartens privately.
Figure 2 presents some important changes in the child care sector following the reform.
All monetary values are indexed to the price level in 2000 so that the real spending
is comparable over time. After the reform, investment in new child care institutions
increased substantially, as can be seen in panel A. We also see that the total number of
child care institutions increase slightly (panel B), primarily due to the increase in private
institutions. The total hours spent in formal care has increased quite a lot, as can be seen
4Or “barnehageforliket”, in Norwegian.
8
50
0
10
00
15
00
20
00
25
00
in
ve
st
m
en
t, 
m
illi
on
 k
ro
ne
rs
 (in
de
xe
d)
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
(a) Investment
28
00
30
00
32
00
34
00
36
00
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Private
Public
(b) Institutions
20
0
25
0
30
0
35
0
40
0
45
0
M
illi
on
s 
of
 h
ou
rs
 in
 c
ar
e
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Hours in public institutions
Hours in private institutions
(c) Hours spent in formal care
20
40
60
80
10
0
10
00
 k
ro
ne
rs
, i
nd
ex
ed
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Private institutions, toddlers
Public institutions, toddlers
Private institutions, preschoolers
Public institutions, preschoolers
(d) Yearly state subsidies
Figure 2: Changes in the child care sector in the 2000s
Source: Statistikkbanken 04683. Subsidy rates from regjeringen.no.
from Panel C.5
The increase in the government subsidies that was announced was also carried through.
Panel D shows the government subsidy rates per child in full-time care, and we see a con-
siderable increase in the subsidy rates over the period. The subsidies are marginally
higher for private institutions than public institutions since 2003, a difference that was
motivated by the need for higher public subsidies to allow the private institutions to lower
the prices, which was previously higher than in public institutions (Kunnskapsdeparte-
mentet, 2007-2008).
The composition of parental fees, municipal support and government subsidies in the
financing of child care is depicted in figure 3. As we can see, the composition has changed
dramatically after the reform. The parental fees have stayed more or less constant over the
period, while the municipal support and government subsidies have increase dramatically.
5These hours are age corrected, meaning that one hour of toddler care accounts for 1.8 hour of
preschooler care. The real number of hours spent in child care has also increased.
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Figure 3: The composition of financing in child care
Source: Statistikkbanken 04683.
This table also shows that the overall municipal support was not reduced as a response
to the increased government subsidies. The large overall increase in expenditures in the
sector over the period is a result of both increases in the number of children and the
increased share of toddlers, requiring more staff and resources per child.
The total result of the reform was a sharp increase in the municipal coverage rates
for 1- and 2-year olds. As can be seen from figure 1, there has been an increase in the
coverage rates for older children, from 80% in 2001 to more than 95% in 2010, while the
toddler coverage has increased more, from 37% to 80%.
The reform also generated large spatial differences in the municipal coverage rates.
Some municipalities responded quickly and more strongly, while others had later or slower
expansions of child care. A graphical representation of the municipal coverage rates in
some selected years can be seen in figure 4. Judging from this map, it is hard to find any
geographical pattern of expansion. The municipal child care coverage for 1 and 2-year
olds is also illustrated in figure 5, showing the distribution of the municipal coverage rates
over the period. This variation will be used to identify the effect of child care for toddlers
in the empirical part of this thesis.
The child care coverage rates that have been reviewed so far and will be used in
the empirical analysis are average rates. They are calculated simply as the fraction of
appropriately aged children in child care to the total population of the same age in the
municipality. These rates, however, aren’t necessarily the chances of obtaining a slot in
child care that the individual mother faces. As there is rationing in the child care market,6
6This rationing is an important assumption for our empirical strategy, and so the degree of rationing
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Figure 4: Municipal coverage rates in 2001, 2005 and 2009
Source: Statistikkbanken 04683.
Figure 5: Distribution of municipal child care coverage rates for 1-2 year olds, 2001-2011
Source: Statistikkbanken 04683.
it is important to understand how this rationing works and how the slots are allocated.
According to the Kindergarten Concord, the municipalities are obliged to coordinate
the application process for applying for child care in the municipality. Most municipalities
have one yearly round of admissions in August with a deadline for application during the
spring. In addition to this, most municipalities accept children during the year as slots
become available, usually prioritizing by time spent on the waiting list. Two groups have
priority by law in this process: disabled children and children enrolled in the child welfare
system. In addition to this, the municipality and the individual child care institution are
free to choose other rules for admission and priority. Common criteria for priority include
children of single parents, children from families with extraordinary challenges due to
health conditions or disabilities of siblings or parents, children of low earners, children
with siblings in the same child care institution and children of immigrants.
After having supplied child care to the applicants from the priority groups according
to the rules in the municipality, the rest of the slots are generally divided according to
age or distributed randomly.
This means that the current child care coverage rate isn’t necessarily the rate that the
individual mother faces. A mother with a child in one of the priority groups, for example,
will more or less know for certain that she will have access to a slot in child care. Since
the priority groups generally constitute a very small share of total applicants, this will
not be a major problem for the empirical strategy.7
4 Theory of the child care market
To understand the effects of a child care reform on female labor supply, some insights
can be gained from economic theory. When we discuss labor participation, we usually
distinguish between the extensive and the intensive margin of labor participation. Policy
changes might induce changes in who choose to work and who do not (the extensive
margin), or changes in the hours worked among those who already work (the intensive
margin). In the following, we focus on the extensive margin.
4.1 The modes of child care
Labor supply and child care are joint decisions: They are dependent on each other. It’s
useful to structure the different combination of these choices that a mother can make. In
general, we can distinguish between three modes of child care: Parental care, informal
care and formal care. Some studies (e.g. Blau and Currie (2006)) also distinguish between
relative and non-relative informal care, but for our treatment, grouping the two will be
will be explored further in section 6.2.
7This could be solved by instrumenting the actual child care usage with the municipal child care
coverage rates, but since we don’t have access to individual usage data, that is beyond this thesis.
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sufficient. Informal care arrangements include non-parental care by relatives, friends and
neighbors as well as unregistered child minders etc. Formal care arrangements include
regulated and paid child care services.
This gives rise to the following combinations of care and employment:
Table 1: Care and employment combinations
Alternative Mother
employed
Formal
care used
Informal
care used
1 No No No
2 Yes No Yes
3 Yes Yes No
Table adapted from Blau and Currie (2006).8
There are four more possible alternatives, but these are of limited interest. Any
combination of formal or informal care combined with not working will be a waste, as
there is a price to these services and the mother could just as well have taken care of the
child herself, given that her leisure time is equally valuable with and without caring for
the child. Combining formal and informal care would mean more time spent on organizing
care alternatives. Also, paid informal care alternatives are not subsidized the same way
as formal alternatives, so that paid informal care alternatives will be relatively expensive.
Of course, if we introduce quality concerns, some parents might believe that their child is
better off in the part-time care of relatives, but this is nonetheless a rare combination of
care and employment.
Increased availability of subsidized care will have two effects: It gives an incentive to
work and use formal child care, and thus increases the probability of choosing alternative 3
and decreases the probability of choosing alternative 1. This is what we will call efficient
substitution, given that it leads to increased female labor supply. The price decrease
however also provides another incentive: To choose alternative 3 over 2 conditional on
working. This is the informal substitution, it doesn’t translate into increased labor force
participation.
In addition to this, the price subsidy might give an incentive to increase labor supply
for mothers who are already working and using formal care, but this depends on the
relative size of the income- and substitution effects. This is the effect on the intensive
margin.
4.2 Why subsidize child care?
In a perfect market with full information, there would be no reason to subsidize child
care. The theory on the child care market does however supply arguments for doing so.
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According to Blau (2003), these reasons may be roughly separated in three categories.
There are self-sufficiency arguments, arguing that child care can help keep low-income
caretakers stay in employment. This will reduce their welfare dependency and might
reduce human capital depreciation from not working. If there is positive serial correlation
in employment, this might raise a case for subsidizing child care as a way of keeping
parents in the workforce.
The second class of arguments concerns imperfections in the market for child care. If
there are positive externalities of child care or parents lack foresight on their children’s
behalf, they might not correctly evaluate the effects of child care, thus underinvesting in
it. Walker, Goldberg, Schultz, Piel, Zigler, and Finn-Stevenson (1996) also argue that
liquidity constraints - the inability to use future earnings as collateral when borrowing
money for investing in child care - might lead to market imperfections. These market
imperfections might be mitigated via state subsidies.
The third class of arguments for subsidies is distributional - that universal or targeted
child care can be a tool for redistribution. Inherent in this argument is the willingness to
accept efficiency losses to achieve redistribution. We leave paternalistic arguments and
arguments of child care as merit goods out for now.
4.3 Child care models
To understand how mothers make labor supply decisions, fairly simple, one-person optimal
labor supply models are common in the literature to predict the effects of subsidizing child
care (Hardoy and Schøne, 2010; Blau and Currie, 2006). The mother is the agent in these
models, maximizing a utility function over consumption and leisure. Assume that the
child must be taken care of at all times, so that the mother must purchase formal child
care services for all the hours she works. This simply reduces the net gain from an hour
of work to w − p where p is the price of an hour of care. The mother will equalize her
marginal utility of leisure, measured in units of the consumption good, to the payoff of
another hour of work net of the child care costs.
Subsidizing child care will make the mother instead equate this marginal rate of sub-
stitution to w − p + s, where s is the subsidy. This will yield higher labor supply if
we assume that leisure and consumption are normal goods. This situation is presented
graphically in figure 6. The mother allocates where her indifference curve intersects the
budget constraint, and subsidizing child care will shift the slope of this budget constraint
as illustrated.
The woman with the dotted indifference curves will be better off, but her total labor
supply response cannot be signed, as the subsidy has income and substitution effects that
work in opposite directions. The woman with the solid indifference curves, however, will
unambiguously increase her labor supply. Without the subsidy, she had a reservation
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Figure 6: A simple labor supply model
wage given by the tangent of the indifference curve at b0, which was higher than the net
payoff given by the slope of the budget line, and she chose not to work. After the subsidy,
she will allocate at point b1, with less leisure and increased labor supply.
This simple model does not take into account informal care alternatives. Blau and
Currie (2006) remedy this by presenting another model, in which informal care can be used
as an alternative and the leisure of the relative providing this care is incorporated into the
utility function of the mother. This yields the prediction that the mother will combine
formal and informal care so that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and the leisure of the relative equals the market price of care, while formal care will be
used for the rest of the working hours of the mother.
None of these models take into account the effects different forms of care might have
on the development of the child. Blau (2003) develops a model where the mother can
freely purchase care of different quality that affects the development of the child, of which
the mother cares. The effects of subsidies in such quality-quantity models are hard to
sign, but it can be shown that there is a trade-off between the goals of having higher
quality care for children and the goal of increasing female labor supply. If the main goal
is to increase female labor supply, the subsidy should be tied to the amount of care used,
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not the quality. If the goal of the subsidy is to further child development, the subsidy
should rather be tied to the quality of the care than the amount.9
4.4 A model of rationed formal care
These models have interesting implications, but are not directly applicable to the Nor-
wegian child care market. We do not observe widespread combinations of formal and
informal care, as the informal care model of Blau and Currie (2006) predict. Rather,
the Norwegian market is characterized by a heavily subsidized formal care sector at fixed
prices. There are also strict regulations related to the pedagogical content and quality of
the child care institutions to qualify for these subsidies.
The size of the subsidy makes sure that more or less no child care institutions are run
without the support. Asplan Viak (2008b) conclude that a maximum of 60 child care
institutions, out of a total 6,400, choose to charge more than the max price. In practice,
this ensures that there is a large supply of formal child care with homogenous quality
because they have to adhere to strict regulations.10 Therefore, the assumptions of the
quality-quantity model do not fit the market either.
The market is also characterized by rationing. Asplan Viak (2008a, 2006) investigate
waiting lists in Norwegian kindergartens. They find that 6.2% of all children of preschool
age were on a waiting list for child care in 2006 and 3.7% in 2008. Since there were more
or less full child care coverage for older children, a large majority of these children are 1-
and 2-years old, so the rationing of child care for toddlers is much more severe.
This does not fit well with the assumptions of the models presented earlier, where a
mother can freely choose the quality of care at an increasing price per hour for higher
quality care, and where all markets clear. Rather, the Norwegian market is characterized
by an informal sector consisting of paid and unpaid care primarily as an alternative to a
rationed formal market for those who do not get a slot in formal care.
4.4.1 The model
To understand a how a child care expansion will work in a rationed market for child care,
we therefore present a model more tailored to fit what we see in Norway. Assume that
there is an underlying supply function in the formal market Sf , an increasing function of
the price, illustrated by the dotted line in figure 7. There is a maximum price pf that a
child care provider can command in order to qualify for subsidies. The supply function
that the consumer faces will thus have a discontinuity, as illustrated in figure 7. We adopt
9As mentioned, the total effect cannot be signed without further assumptions, but it can be shown
that the effect on labor supply will be more positive or less negative from an amount-subsidy than a
quality-subsidy.
10Even if there are differences in quality between formal child care institutions, these are very hard for
a mother to evaluate.
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the standard arbitrage market assumption,11 which ensures that the available child care
slots will be allocated to the mothers with the highest willingness to pay.
After the slots in formal child care have been distributed to the consumers with the
highest willingness to pay, we assume that the excess demand is such that no consumer
would be willing to pay the full, non-subsidized price of a formal slot in child care. Looking
at figure 3, the formal care is financed by only a small share parental fees, indicating that
the price for formal care without subsidies will have to be very high. The excess demand
for child care will thus have to be met by an informal market.
We furthermore assume that there is a utility cost of having a child in informal care
rather than formal care. This cost can represent the disutility a mother inflicts upon her
relatives, the decreased child development from the inferior quality of informal care or
some other utility cost. This cost comes in addition to the monetary cost of informal
care. For expositional clarity, we choose to add this cost to the informal supply curve
rather than subtract it from the demand curve. This allows us to represent one unified
demand function D for the two markets. The supply curve Si thus represents the total
cost of producing an informal child care slot that is equivalent in utility to the mother
as a slot in the formal market. The vertical axis no longer measures only the monetary
price, but rather the total utility cost of informal care measured in monetary terms. For
the formal market, the vertical axis still measures monetary price.
Lastly, we assume for simplicity that each mother has only one child in need of care,
that the mother will not utilize any care if she does not work and that the price of informal
care is such that a mother will not combine formal and informal care.12 All increase in
use of formal or informal care will thus translate directly into increased labor supply.
This situation is illustrated in figure 7. There is a maximum price pf that decides
the size of the rationed formal market, a0. This point is the starting point for a new,
informal market, which clears at the intersection of the demand and informal supply
functions. This means that there is an informal market of size b0− a0. To completely lift
the rationing if the formal market, c slots in formal care would have to be supplied.
4.4.2 The effect of child care expansion
We are now ready to analyze what happens when the government increases the subsidies
to increase the supply of formal child care. We start out in a situation as discussed
previously, with a formal market of size a0 and an informal market of size b0 − a0, as
illustrated in figure 8. The government then increases the subsidy by ρ, leading the
formal supply function to shift downwards, from S0f to S1f . This will increase the size
11This will be relaxed in section 4.4.3.
12We are looking at the external margin of labor supply, so this assumption is not so unlikely. The
change in labor supply would require child care for at least a substantial amount of the normal working
day.
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Figure 7: A model of rationed child care
Figure 8: Increased subsidies in the rationing model
of the formal market to a1. The new informal market will start in this point, and the
informal supply function will shift from S0i to S1i . The new informal market will clear at
b1 and the size of the informal market will be reduced from b0−a0 to b1−a1. The number
of children in non-parental care, and under our assumption also the number of working
women, will increase by b1 − b0. This is smaller than the increase in formal child care,
a1 − a0.
The reform thus has the following effect: Spending ρ ∗ a1, the government creates
a1−a0 new slots in child care. This expansion leads to a total of b1−b0 < a1−a0 mothers
beginning to work, while the rest of the expansion is taken up by mothers moving from
informal care arrangements to formal care. The expansion thus crowds out informal care,
and the increase in labor supply is smaller than the increase in formal care.
If we for the sake of the argument assume that the Sf , Si and D functions are linear,
we can find an expression for the efficiency of the reform. Using linear algebra, we find
that
b1 − b0 = βi
(βd + βi)βf
ρ =
βi
βi + βd
(a1 − a0) < a1 − a0 (1)
Where βi is the slope of the informal supply function, βf the slope of the formal supply
curve and βd the slope of the demand function. The degree to which the expansion will
lead more women to start working will depend on the slopes of the demand and supply
functions. Since the prices in this model are utility costs, not monetary cost, we cannot
use this model to construct a theoretical prediction for the ratio b1−b0
a1−a0 , which is analogous
to what will be estimated in the empirical part of this thesis, but this nonetheless serves
to illustrate the substitution that takes place following a child care reform.
4.4.3 Relaxing the arbitrage market assumption
Like most simple supply and demand models with rationing, this model is based on the
assumption that there is an arbitrage market, a side market where child care slots are
bought and sold until the slots are allocated to the mothers with the highest willingness
to pay. This sort of trade is beneficial to both parties, so that a trade of a child care
slot to a mother with a higher willingness to pay will give rise to a Pareto improvement,
leaving both women better off. We thus get an ordering of the market by willingness to
pay, ensuring a smooth, decreasing demand function.
In general, this is not how child care slots are allocated in Norway. Slots in child
care are not bought or sold privately, and willingness to pay is not part of the criteria
for how the slots are allocated. There are therefore reasons to believe that the arbitrage
assumption is not reasonable, and we must ask how this affects the analysis.
The arbitrage assumption is investigated in figure 9. To put it simply, lack of arbitrage
means that one mother in area A that would get a slot in formal care under arbitrage,
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Figure 9: Effects of relaxing arbitrage in the rationing model
B C D E
Before expansion 0 + + 0
After expansion 0 0 + 0
Total effect of the reform 0 - 0 0
The effects on labor supply of relaxing the arbitrage
assumption by switching one slot in formal care
from a mother in area A to a mother in area B, C,
D or E, before and after the reform.
does not. Instead, this slot is allocated to a mother in one of the other areas B, C, D or E.
To analyze the effect of the missing arbitrage market, we therefore look at how the effects
of an expansion would change if a slot in formal care was transferred from a mother in
area A to a mother in area B, C, D or E in figure 9. In general, relaxing the arbitrage
assumption in this way will have positive or no effects on labor supply, of course at the
cost of being Pareto inefficient.
We start out by looking at the mother in A who does not get a slot in formal care.
Since she has a high willingness to pay, she will buy care in the informal market and
continue working, so relaxing the arbitrage market assumption will have no effect on her
labor supply.
If a mother in B gets a slot in care, we will not get a change in labor supply, since this
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woman was working also under arbitrage. The effect of this is simply a swap of child care
slots with no effect on labor supply. For a mother in C, however, we will see a difference
before and after the reform. Before the reform, the woman in C would start working if she
got access to formal care, which she was not under arbitrage. This will not happen after
the reform, as she is now covered by the formal market. Relaxing the arbitrage market
assumption will decrease the effect of the child care expansion.
A mother in area D is not willing to pay the price in the informal market, neither
before nor after the reform. She is however willing to pay the price in the formal market,
and so she will accept and start working if she is offered a slot in formal care. Relaxing
the arbitrage market assumption this way therefore increases labor supply, both before
and after the reform. Lastly, a mother in area E is not willing to pay the price for formal
care, so she will not apply and cannot alter the conclusion.
The results of this analysis are summed up in table in figure 9. As we can see, relaxing
the arbitrage assumption does at no point increase the labor supply response of the reform.
Rather, it may decrease the effect of the reform, depending on how the rationing works.
If the rationing works so that at least some mothers in area C is offered slots in formal
care at the expense of mothers with higher willingness to pay, the expansion will have
a smaller effect on labor supply than argued in the previous section. How the rationing
of child care works is briefly described in section 3. To assess how much smaller effect a
reform will have due to the missing arbitrage market, we would have to analyze how the
willingness to pay13 correlates with the criteria for getting a slot in formal care, which is
beyond the scope of this thesis.
To sum up, the models reviewed in this section predict that labor supply should
increase as a response to increased availability of child care. There is however also sub-
stitution from mothers already working and using informal care, so that an expansion
crowds out informal care. The relative magnitudes of these two effects and the total effect
of a child care expansion on female labor supply are an empirical question.
5 Data and descriptive statistics
Our data come from administrative registers from Statistics Norway.14 The data covers
the entire resident population of Norway from 2001 to 2009. According to a review by
Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995), this data is of excellent quality and cover-
age, and received the highest rating. The data contains a unique personal identification
number, which allows us to match each mother with her children and the father of the
children.
Data on annual earnings come from the national tax records. This is supplemented
13Or actually, being in area C.
14The data is made available through the Frisch Centre for Economic Research.
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with demographic data and data on residency from the Central Population Register.
Education data comes from the official education registers.
Data on the municipal use of child care is readily available through Statistics Norway’s
online database Statistikkbanken.15 These data are reported annually by the municipal-
ities themselves, and are the basis for subsidy eligibility. We construct the child care
coverage rate as the ratio of registered 1- and 2-year olds in child care to the total pop-
ulation of the same age. The result of this definition is that a couple of municipalities
will have child care coverage rates above 1 for a few years, probably due to children
from neighboring municipalities attending child care institutions. For these few cases, the
coverage rates have been adjusted to 1.
There are registers covering hours worked,16 but these registers only cover non-random
parts of the population.17 Therefore, we follow Havnes and Mogstad (2011) and measure
labor market attachment by annual earnings, constructing dummy variables equal to one if
earnings exceed specific thresholds. These thresholds are multiples of the Basic Amount
of the Norwegian welfare system, which is consumer price indexed annually. In 2012,
one basic amount equaled 82,122 NOK, or approximately 14,100 USD. In the baseline
specification the main outcome variables are dummies equal to 1 if earnings exceed 2 or
4 basic amounts, where 2 basic amounts can be considered at least a substantial amount
of part-time employment and is interpreted as labor force participation. 4 basic amounts
can be considered more or less full-time employment. We have also investigate linear
earnings as an outcome variable, as well as each percentile of the income distribution as
thresholds in figure 11.
We also utilize various other municipality characteristics from Statistikkbanken. Among
them are population data, data on rural and urban population, employment in different
sectors, employment by gender, registered unemployment, political representation and
data on municipal income and spending.18 These data are used to construct subsamples,
to investigate different trends in child care expansion in different municipality types and
to perform the preliminary exogeneity tests in section 6.2. For an overview of the most
imporant variables used in this thesis and their sources, see tables 8 and 9 in the appendix.
5.1 The sample of interest
To construct the main sample, we start with the entire Norwegian population of mothers
in 2001 to 2009. We include only mothers whose youngest child turns 1 or 2 in the sample
year if the child is born before September 1st, or who turns 2 or 3 in the sample year
if the child is born after August 31st. The reason for using this definition is to avoid
15http://www.ssb.no/statistikkbanken, specifically table 04683.
16The Register for Employers and Employees, or “Arbeidstakerregisteret”
17Specifically, they exclude employees in small private firms.
18Tables 07459, 05212, 03324, 01610, 01603, 01182 and 04901, respectively.
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the heavy impact the early months of maternity leave would have on labor supply, as
well as acknowledge that the time of starting child care often follow the school year. This
definition thus ensures that all mothers in the sample have children aged between 5 and 35
months.19 We exclude women with another, younger child and women who are registered
as students at least one month during the year, and also exclude two observations with
data abnormalities.
The education data is a variable on the highest attained education. It is a cate-
gorical variable coded according to the Norwegian Standard Classification for Education
(NUS2000). To allow for flexible effects of education, for example through sheepskin ef-
fects, we use seven dummy variables, equal to 1 if a person has primary education (7
years), lower secondary education (10 years), basic upper secondary education (12 years),
final upper secondary education (13 years), post-secondary non-tertiary education (14
years), undergraduate tertiary education (17 years) and graduate tertiary education (19
years). These dummies are included to control for the impact of education on labor supply
in a flexible way.
Education data is missing for some observations, to a larger extent than others immi-
grants. Instead of excluding these observations, we set their education to the lowest level
and include a separate dummy. This also ensures that an observation is not dropped even
if data on the father is missing.
The resulting sample consists of 746,941 observations. There are observations on a
total of 347,787 women, with an average of 2.15 observations per woman. The multiple
observations per women stems from two sources: Most women are observed twice for each
child,20 and some women have more than one child in the sample period.
Summary statistics for the main variables of interest used in the empirical analysis can
be found in table 2. We see that an average of 67% of mothers of 1- and 2-year olds work
according to our participation definition, while around 38% work full-time. The average
age of the mother is around 32 years, while they on average had their first child at almost
27 years. Education average around 14 years, approximately one year more than high
school. We also see that education among fathers are slightly lower than among mothers,
although this is probably because education data is more often missing for fathers than
mothers, and observations with missing education data have had their education set to
the lowest level (7 years).
19We have also tried a separate definition where women are simply included the year where their
youngest child turns 1 or 2, without this having any impact on the results.
20Unless they have another child or have a child at the start or end of the sample period.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Standard deviation Min Max
Age 32.41 5.05 15 69
Age at first birth 26.80 4.90 7 54
Earnings (BA equivalents) 3.27 2.66 0 244
Earnings > 1 BA 0.76 0.42 0 1
Earnings > 2 BA 0.67 0.47 0 1
Earnings > 4 BA 0.38 0.48 0o 1
Earnings > 8 BA 0.04 0.19 0 1
Immigrant 0.19 0.39 0 1
Cohabitation 0.55 0.50 0 1
Number of older siblings 1.01 1.01 0 15
Child is female 0.48 0.50 0 1
Child care coverage, toddlers 0.56 0.17 0 1
Education (years) 13.82 3.40 7 19
Education of father (years) 13.53 3.30 7 19
N 746,941
Summary statistics of all non-studying mothers with their youngest child aged 1 or 2 in
2001 to 2009.
6 Empirical strategy
To study the effect of increased coverage of child care for toddlers, we exploit the temporal
and spatial variation in municipal coverage rates following the Kindergarten Concord that
is illustrated in figure 5. We employ a fixed effects linear probability model where we
explain changes in labor supply by changes in the municipal child care coverage rate for
toddlers. For a thorough treatment of unobserved heterogeneity panel data model, see
(Wooldridge, 2010, chapter 10). The model estimates
yikt = αk + τt + γCC
12
kt + δu
m
kt + βX it + δZit + ikt (2)
yikt is a measure of labor supply for mother i living in municipality k in year t. CC12kt ,
the child care coverage rate for toddlers in municipality k in year t, is the main explanatory
variable of interest. umkt is the unemployment rate for men in municipality k in year t,
and is included to control for local labor market conditions. X it is a vector of individual
control variables containing information on the mother and the father of the youngest
child of mother i, while Zit is a vector of child characteristics.
αk and τt captures municipality and time-fixed effects. The reason for using these
dummies is that we worry that there is unobserved heterogeneity at the municipality level,
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so that women in some municipalities have higher or lower labor supply independently
of the coverage rates of child care. By using fixed effects, we explain the changes in
labor supply by the changes in child care coverage, and thus get rid of the unobserved
heterogeneity as long as the composition of this heterogeneity is constant within the
municipality.21 In practice, what we do is calculate the deviation from the mean in the
municipality for all variables. The time fixed effects τt accounts for yearly shocks to labor
supply that affect all women the same way.
We also want to control for other variables that could affect changes in labor supply
and correlate with child care coverage, thus confounding our estimate of γ. Therefore, we
include Zit and X it in the regression. In X it, we include dummies for different levels of
education of the mother and the father, a dummy for immigrant status, a cohabitation
dummy equal to one if the parents are living together, age and age squared and age and
age squared at first birth. In Zit we include the gender of the child, number of older
siblings, dummy variables for the birth month of the child and a dummy if the child is in
its last toddler year. For a full overview of the variables used, see table 8 and 9 in the
appendix.
When designing our regression model, we must be careful not to include so-called bad
controls. These are variables that could themselves be outcome variables. The problem
with bad controls is that they introduce a variant of the selection problem: Even if
our treatment is initially randomly determined, the introduction of conditioning on bad
controls breaks the random assignment and creates selection bias. Bad controls change
the composition of the treatment and control groups, and so we no longer compare apples
to apples, as Angrist and Pischke (2008) put it.
For this reason, we should not use variables that could be affected by changes in the
child care coverage rates as control variables. Among the control variables we use, very
few could be suspected of being determined by changes in the child care coverage rate.
There is little reason to believe that civil status could be influenced by changes in child
care coverage rates, at least not within the same year. The only individual level control
variable that can be suspected of being a bad control is education - mothers might be
more or less likely to take more education when the changes in child care coverage differ.
However, since we only look at changes within the same year and since active students
are excluded, this is a minor problem.22
umkt is the unemployment rate for men in the municipality. We include this to control for
local labor market conditions that might affect labor supply. The overall unemployment
21We also run a robustness analysis with fixed effects at the individual level to test whether the results
could be driven by changes in the composition of the unobserved, constant heterogeneity at the individual
level.
22When performing persistency analysis, thus looking at longer time intervals, this becomes a bigger
problem. We therefore use 2001 values of the control variables in the persistency analysis to avoid the
bad control problem, see section 7.1.
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could be suspected of being a bad control since it can be affected by changes in child
care coverage. Therefore, we rather use the unemployment among men only to minimize
this problem, reducing the spillover effects. Since there are less variation in labor market
participation among men than women, the unemployment for men also better reflect
conditions in the labor market.
If the changes in coverage rates, conditional on the other control variables, is uncor-
related to the error term ikt, then the estimate of γ from equation 2 is unbiased. This
is the strict exogeneity assumption. For this to hold, changes in child care coverage rates
must be exogenous to changes in labor supply. This assumption is violated if there are
omitted time-varying variables at the municipality level or omitted variables in general
at the individual level that is correlated with both changes in female labor supply and
changes in child care coverage rates. Therefore, an analysis of what drives expansion of
child care is important to determine whether this variation can be regarded as exogenous.
For a preliminary analysis of this exogeneity, see section 6.2. Several possible violations of
the assumptions underlying our estimation strategy are discussed and tested for in section
7.2.
Throughout this thesis, we cluster the standard errors at the municipality level. If
there is reason to believe that changes in labor supply is correlated within a municipality,
the normal standard errors obtained from the fixed effect regression will be too small.
Even if the estimate itself is unbiased, using incorrect standard errors can lead to wrong
conclusions. There are many reasons to believe that observations within a municipality
are correlated, both over time and across women. First, the number of women moving is
small, so the population within one municipality over time will to a large degree consist
of the same women. If there is serial correlation in changes in a woman’s labor supply,
there will also be serial correlation in the changes of labor supply within one municipality.
There are also reasons to believe that there is correlation between women within a
municipality in the same year. There might be other local labor market conditions that
affect (some) women in the municipality the same way, or there might be some structure
of the child care system itself that creates correlation between the labor market outcomes
of women living in the same municipality. For these reasons, we use clustered standard
errors at the municipality level for all regressions. Since there are 430 municipalities in the
sample, which are well above the rule-of-thumb level of 50 clusters for clustered standard
errors to be consistent.
6.1 The rationing of the child care market
In a non-rationed market, the number of children in child care can change due to changes
in both supply and demand. This means that observed correlation between changes in
child care coverage and changes in labor supply could be a result of reverse causality:
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Table 3: Rationing index
Year Mean SD Rationed Non-rationed Rationed share
2001 1.730 .690 391 39 90.9%
2002 1.611 .666 379 51 88.1%
2003 1.476 .694 358 72 83.3%
2004 1.365 .572 354 76 82.3%
2005 1.206 .359 326 104 75.8%
2006 1.062 .237 265 165 61.2%
2007 1.009 .257 203 227 47.2%
2008 .967 .150 148 282 34.4%
2009 .938 .166 122 308 28.4%
Total 1.263 .550 2,546 1,324 65.8%
That changes in female labor supply lead to increased observed child care coverage. In a
rationed market, however, the observed child care coverage rates will not change due to
changes in demand until the rationing is lifted.23 The rationing of the formal market is
thus an important assumption supporting our estimation strategy and reducing problems
of reverse causality. This section further investigates this rationing assumption.
Reports from 2006 and 2008 (Asplan Viak, 2006, 2008a) find that an average of 6.2%
and 3.7% of children in preschool age was on a waiting list for child care on September
20th these two years. There was more or less full coverage for older children in this
period, so that the waiting list consists primarily of toddlers, making the real rationing
for toddlers a lot more severe. The average time on a waiting list was 3.7 weeks in 2008.
No such number is available for 2006, but since the general availability was lower, we
can assume it was at least as long. The 2006 report also cover some numbers that might
indicate increases in demand for child care following the max price reform, but as long as
child care is rationed, this should not affect the observed child care coverage rates.
To further investigate the rationing of child care, we construct a rationing index for
each municipality. Using the 2 BA definition labor force participation defintion,24 we
compare the share of mothers of toddlers that work to the child care coverage rates. We
use the baseline sample of mothers.25 The larger this rationing index, the more severe is
the rationing. We consider a municipality rationed if the index is above 1. This index can
23Of course, we could think that municipalities or private child care institutions might respond to
increases in demand for child care by constructing more child care institutions, thereby creating a channel
for lagged reverse causality. As construction of new child care institutions takes a long time and we only
investigate changes in child care coverage and labor supply within the same year, this is a minor problem.
24See section 5 for a description of these definitions.
25Because there might be demand for child care also for mothers that are not part of our sample, for
example active students and mothers with another, younger child, the real rationing may be bigger than
what reflected in the rationing index.
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be interpreted as the number of working mothers per child in child care. Table 3 presents
the mean and standard deviation of the rationing index for each year, and also the number
of municipalities that are rationed and non-rationed according to this definition. We see
that for most of the period, a large majority of the municipalities were indeed rationed
according to this definition.
Based on this rationing index and the reports reviewed above, we find support for
the rationing assumption. Changes in observed child care seem to be driven primarily by
changes in supply, not demand. This reduces problems of reverse causality and simplifies
the analysis of the exogeneity of the child care coverage: We need not fear unobserved
variables that correlate with changes in female labor supply and changes in demand for
child care.
6.2 Testing the exogeneity of the child care expansion
In most empirical research, the laboratory experiment is the gold standard to investigate
causality. In a lab, you randomly determine who get the treatment, and so ensure that
the treatment and control groups are similar except from treatment status. In empirical
social science, a laboratory setting or random allocation of treatment is rare. In that case,
drawing conclusions on causality is more complicated.
In our case, the treatment is a continuous measure of child care coverage. Expanding
child care is of course a conscious choice among private firms or municipalities, and not
randomly determined, but we will in this section investigate whether the changes in child
care coverage can be regarded as random and exogenous to the changes in female labor
supply. An analysis of what drives child care expansion can shed light on this question.
If determinants of the expansion are systematically related to underlying trends in
maternal employment, we may be worried about differences in the characteristics of early
and late expanders. It is useful, therefore, to understand the determinants of the expansion
across municipalities. To further test the exogeneity of the child care expansion, we use
a fixed effects regression to explain the changes in child care coverage. This way, we can
see if there are municipality characteristics that seem to determine what municipalities
expand early. To check this, run
CC12kt = λk + pit +
M∑
m=1
ϕmtVm,k,2001 + ekt (3)
Where λk and pit are year and municipality dummies, Vm,k,2001 is characteristic m in
municipality k in 2001 and ϕmt is the effect of this characteristic on child care coverage
in year t. This relates the changes in child care coverage to municipality characteristics.
We use municipality characteristics from before the expansion to ensure that the charac-
teristics are not themselves results of the reform. This way, we can investigate whether
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some municipality characteristics were associated with earlier or later expansion.
In the m municipality characteristics we investigate, we include economic, political
and geographical municipality characteristics as well as labor market indicators that we
suspect can explain child care expansion. All characteristics are measured in 2001, before
the reform. The labor market indicators consist of initial female labor force participa-
tion,26 registered unemployment among women and the initial child care coverage rate for
toddlers.
The economic indicators are the non-earmarked income per capita in the municipal
accounts and a hydropower dummy indicating whether the municipality had any extraor-
dinary tax income from hydropower between 1992 and 2001. This sort of income is not
earmarked, and so increases the possibility of prioritizing child care expansion. Both
these are included to see whether there are systematic differences in expansion between
municipalities with a lot of financial freedom and those with tight budgets.
In the political indicators we include the share of female representatives in the munic-
ipal council and the share of representatives from left-wing parties. These are included to
see whether political priorities or gender can affect child care expansion. Last, we include
a measure of urbanity: The share of the population living in urban areas.27
Finding significant differences in expansion rates based on these characteristics isn’t
necessarily a problem - only if we also believe that these characteristics may be correlated
with changes in female labor supply. This is a preliminary examination of the common
trend assumption underlying our method.
The results from this exercise are depicted in figure 10. The ϕmt coefficients of are
drawn for each year for each of the characteristics, as well as confidence intervals using 1%,
5% and 10% significance levels. As expected, we see that the initial child care coverage rate
is significantly and negatively associated with expansion in child care. The municipalities
with high initial coverage expand less simply because there is less to go, and expand even
less later in the period. Initial female labor participation seems to be positively related
to expansion, especially in the later years, but only borderline significant, while initial
female unemployment have little explanatory power over the pace of expansion.
Neither the political characteristics nor the urbanity index yield any significant results.
No significant differences in the expansion rates among municipalities with different po-
litical representation reinforce the view that the reform had broad bipartisan support.
Last, we find little effect from the economic indicators. It seems that initial differ-
ences in municipality revenues do not affect child care expansion rates, probably because
these differences are largely offset by ear-marked grants from the central government and
because tax rates and tax bases are centrally determined.
26This is measured as the share of registered female employees to the total female workforce aged 16
to 67.
27We have also performed the same exercise using the share of employees in the primary, secondary
and tertiary sector as well as overall unemployment rates, without this yielding any significant results.
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Figure 10: Testing exogeneity of the child care expansion
Overall, there is little reason to worry when performing this exercise. Among the
characteristics investigated, none except the initial child care coverage itself has any ex-
planatory power over the pace of expansion. This strengthens our belief that the child
care expansion can indeed be considered exogenous. Further robustness checks to test the
exogeneity of the expansion will be performed in section 7.2.
7 Results
This section presents results based on equation 2. The main outcome variable is the
2 basic amounts (BA) labor supply definition, which we will interpret as labor force
participation. When only one results of a regression is reported in the text, this is the 2
BA outcome. The 4 BA threshold constitutes full-time employment. Only the coefficient
for the child care coverage rate is reported, not the control variables, but the controls are
always included in the regression.
The main results are presented in table 4, the baseline estimate of γ in equation 2
in row 1. We find that a 1 percentage point increase in municipal child care coverage
rate for toddlers is associated with a .11 percentage point increase in women working
at least enough to earn two basic amounts. Put another way, going from no to full
coverage will yield an 11 percentage point increase in female labor force participation.
This constitutes an increase of 16.4% relative to the mean labor supply. The effect on
full-time employment is lower, at around .05, indicating a 5 percentage points, or 13%,
increase in full-time employment from a full-scale expansion of child care. These effects
are significantly different from zero at the 0.1% level.
The baseline regression has also been evaluated for a range of other thresholds of the
outcome variable. Figure 11 presents the estimates for γ using all the percentiles of the
income distribution as cutoff threshold. From this figure, we see that the coefficient is
positive and significantly different from zero up until around the 70th percentile, after
which it eventually drops to be negative, but never significantly different from zero. This
indicates that child care coverage does not affect the probability of having top wages.28
There might be differences in the response to a child care reform from different women.
If so, the baseline results will constitute a mean of these effects. We therefore want to
evaluate the effect in different subsamples to look at heterogeneity in the labor supply
response.29 These results are reported in rows 2 to 7 in table 4.
The results for married and non-married mothers (rows 2 and 3) are fairly similar
to the baseline regression, maybe with a slightly bigger response to child care coverage
28We have also investigated equation 2 using linear earnings as the outcome variable, finding results
very close to and not significantly different from zero. This indicates that there is no effect on earnings
of increased child care coverage.
29In addition to the subsamples presented here, a series of municipal level subsamples are reported in
table 7 in the appendix. In general, these results are close to the baseline estimate.
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Table 4: Main results
Sample 2 BA 4 BA N
Participation Full time
(1) Baseline 0.1096*** 0.0508*** 746,941
(0.0105) (0.0102)
0.666 0.378
(2) Married 0.1209*** 0.0771*** 411,959
(0.0125) (0.0130)
0.661 0.391
(3) Non-married 0.1004*** 0.0291** 334,982
(0.0152) (0.0137)
0.672 0.361
(4) High education only 0.0531*** 0.0709*** 304,015
(0.0136) (0.0205)
0.861 0.622
(5) Low education only 0.1351*** 0.0498*** 442,926
(0.0148) (0.0110)
0.533 0.210
(6) Mothers of 1-year olds 0.1176*** 0.0257* 390,909
(0.0140) (0.0173)
0.647 0.347
(7) Mothers of 2-year olds 0.1020*** 0.0792*** 324,058
(0.0127) (0.0164)
0.683 0.409
(8) Fathers -0.0274 -0.0389* 780,964
(0.0180) (0.0170)
0.906 0.830
Fixed effects regression estimates of γ in equation (2), the effect of child care
for toddlers on maternal labor supply, measured by earnings above 2 basic
amounts (part-time employment) and 4 basic amounts (full-time
employment) of the welfare system. Full sample and subsamples.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level. Mean of
dependent variable underlined.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 11: Baseline regression on the percentiles of the income distribution
among married mothers, especially when examining full-time employment. This might
indicate that married mothers are more responsive to child care availability in their labor
supply, maybe because they to a larger extent pool income with their husbands and thus
have the possibility of opting out of the labor market and earn less for a period.
For the education subsamples, we find large differences between mothers with high and
low education.30 Mothers with low education seem to respond more strongly when we
consider participation, while mothers with high education seem to respond more strongly
when considering full-time employment. An important reason for this finding is that the
potential wages for these women differ: If a well-educated woman chooses to work, she
will more often earn wages above the 4 BA threshold, while the potential wage of the
low-educated mother may lie between the two thresholds.
Even when taking this into account, the differences in response on the participation
and full-time equivalents margins differ substantially between mothers of low and high
education. This might indicate that low educated mothers respond to increases in child
care coverage by participating in the labor market, while high educated mothers rather
respond to differences in coverage on the intensive margin by adjusting working hours.
The fact that the response on the full time equivalents are larger than the participation
response for high educated mothers might indicate that at least parts of the adjustment
takes place on the intensive margin. At least some mothers are induced to increase their
labor supply so that earnings increase from between the two thresholds to above the 4
BA threshold.
30Mothers are considered well educated if they have education beyond high school.
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We can think of several reasons why the response differs like this. One is that the cost
of dropping out of the labor market completely is higher for mothers with higher wages.
High education mothers probably also work in occupations with higher human capital
intensity than low education mothers, and thus the cost of human capital depreciation
from opting out of the labor market might be more severe. Last, well-educated mothers
may have jobs characterized by more flexibility in working hours.
We also investigate the results for mothers of one year olds and mothers of two year
olds separately in rows 6 and 7. We find little difference from the baseline results on
the part-time labor supply for both samples, but we do find differences on the full-time
equivalent labor supply indicator: Among mothers of one year olds, the response is lower
than the baseline result and only significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Among
mothers of two year olds, the coefficient is .792, around 50% larger than the baseline
result. This might indicate that mothers to a larger degree respond to the differences in
child care coverage by starting or postponing full-time employment in the last toddler
year.
Throughout this thesis, we have focused on mothers as they are traditionally the
primary caretakers. We are however also interested in whether there is a response in
the labor supply of fathers to a child care expansion. We therefore run the baseline
regression for fathers. We use the unemployment for women to avoid spillover effects,
but except from that, the regression is similar to equation 2. The results are reported in
column 8, where we see that the results on both participation and full time employment
are negative. The estimates are only significantly different from zero at the 5% level
for full-time employment and borderline to be significant at the 10% level for part-time
employment.31 Still, this indicates that there is some reverse response among fathers:
They tend to decrease labor participation as child care increases, possibly to support the
mother financially when she is not working to take care of the children when child care is
unavailable. This is an indication that mothers are still the primary caretakers when it
comes to young children at home. The fact that the coefficient are not only non-positive,
but negative, might also indicate that child care can lead to more balance in taking care
of children, both when in household and market work.
To sum up, we have found clear evidence of response to the child care availability
among mothers of small children. The response varies somewhat between the different
subsamples considered, especially between low- and high-educated women. There is slight
evidence for opposite response among fathers, although these results are imprecise.
31p-values are 0.023 for full-time employment and 0.128 for part-time employment using two-sided
tests.
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7.1 Persistency analysis
If the effects on labor supply persist also after the toddler years, this will increase the cost
efficiency of the reform. To investigate this, start out with the mothers of the baseline
sample. We look at their labor supply one to three years after the toddler period, excluding
women who have another child or study, as before.
As discussed in the empirical strategy, we must be cautious not to include bad con-
trols when designing a regression model. When performing a persistency analysis like
this, there will be a longer time interval between the explanatory and the dependent vari-
able, and so there is more time for the changes in coverage rates to affect the control
variables and create a bad control problem. We could fear for example that low child care
expansion rates could induce women to take more education in the coming years, before
we measure the persistency in labor supply. To minimize this problem, we use all time
varying covariates from 2001, before the expansion.
We can then run the baseline regression, using the mean of the child care coverage
rate in the toddler years as the variable of interest. Because the mothers are now subject
to the child care for three to five year olds, we also control for the child care coverage rate
for older children. Run the regression
yik,t+s = αk + τt+s + γCC
12
k,t + ηCC
s+2
k,t+s + δu
m
k,2001 + βX i,2001 + δZi,2001 + ikt (4)
where s ∈ 1, 2, 3 is the number of years after the toddler period, CC12k,t+s is the mean
of the coverage rates during the toddler years and CCs+2k,t+s is the current coverage rate
for children the age of the child. If we find significant estimates for γ, this is sign of
persistency in the labor supply response.
The results from this exercise are reported in table 5. We start by repeating the
separate estimates for mothers of 1- and 2-year olds from the main results. We see that
the effect on participation is relatively strong both toddler years, while the response on
the full-time equivalent margin is larger the second toddler year, indicating that mothers
respond by starting or postponing full-time employment. In the three following rows, we
report the estimates of the child care coverage during the toddler period on the labor
supply of the mother when the child is 3, 4 and 5 years old. We see that the effect on
participation drops dramatically and is not significant. Since employment for mothers of
3- to 5-year olds is very common in Norway, this indicates that most of these mothers
work these years, regardless of the coverage rates during the toddler years. There is no
sign of persistency effects in labor force participation.
For full time employment, however, we do find relatively strong signs of persistency.
The coefficients of the mean child care coverage during the toddler period on the labor
supply one to three years later barely drops, and are significantly different from zero at
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Table 5: Persistency analysis
Child age 2 BA 4 BA N
Participation Full time
1 0.1176*** 0.0257* 390,909
(0.0140) (0.0173)
2 0.1020*** 0.0792*** 324,058
(0.0127) (0.0164)
3 0.0363 0.0754** 206,456
(0.0203) (0.0230)
4 0.0222 0.0714** 156,189
(0.0220) (0.0250)
5 0.0306 0.0656** 123,159
(0.0268) (0.0247)
Fixed effects regression of equation 4. Effects of the mean of child care
coverage during the toddler years 1-3 years later, controlled for the child care
coverage rates of older children. Initially the baseline sample, excluding
students and mothers who have another child.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
the 1% level. This indicates that a 1 percentage point higher average coverage leads
to around 0.08 percentage points higher full-time labor supply one to three years later
among these mothers. There are several possible reasons for these findings: Staying in
employment during the toddler years might increase the chances of getting a pay raise,
promotion or full-time position later. These are important findings when discussing the
costs and benefits of child care expansion.
7.2 Robustness analysis
In this section, we want to check the robustness of our previous results. To do this,
we perform several different specification and robustness tests. The results from these
tests are reported in table 6, showing only the coefficient for the child care coverage rate,
although the control variables are always included in the regression.
In the baseline specification we used fixed effects at the municipality level. These also
take account of individual fixed heterogeneity in labor supply as long as the composition of
36
Table 6: Robustness analyses
FE level Sample / check 2 BA 4 BA N
Participation Full time
(1) Municipality Baseline 0.1096*** 0.0508*** 746,941
(0.0105) (0.0102)
(2) Individual Baseline 0.0741*** 0.0473*** 746,941
(0.0166) (0.0122)
(3) Individual First child in 0.0778*** 0.0298*** 381,858
sample only (0.0279) (0.0126)
(4) Muncipality Excluding 4 0.1067*** 0.0493*** 562,042
urban municipalities (0.0120) (0.0123)
(5) Municipality Excluding 11 0.1068*** 0.0501*** 492,598
urban municipalities (0.0123) (0.0128)
(6) Municipality Using municipality of 0.0873*** 0.0376*** 708,808
residence in 2001 (0.0093) (0.0093)
(7) Municipality Municipality changers 0.0927*** 0.0310*** 493,650
dropped (0.0113) (0.0122)
(8) Municipality Municipality specific 0.0841*** 0.0436*** 746,941
trends (eq. 5) (0.0139) (0.0136)
(9) Municipality Characteristic specific 0.0833*** 0.0564*** 746,208
time shocks (eq. 6) (0.0127) (0.0120)
(10) Municipality Placebo control (eq. 7): 0.0256 -0.0179 199,372
Mothers of 3-year olds (0.0179) (0.0190)
(11) Municipality Placebo control (eq. 7): 0.0136 -0.00988 151,405
Mothers of 4-year olds (0.0224) (0.0224)
Results from various robustness checks described in the text. Coefficient of child care coverage for
toddlers reported, regressions include standard set of regressors from equation 2. Labor supply
measured by participation (earnings > 2 basic amounts) and full-time equivalents (earnings > 4 basic
amounts).
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
these individual fixed effects in the municipality is unchanged. To test whether this holds,
we then restrict ourselves to considering only changes in labor supply among the same
mothers over time, controlling for all time invariant characteristics using fixed effects at
the individual level. Of course, this leaves out the time invariant covariates, as the effect of
these covariates will be picked up by the individual fixed effect. If the coefficient is stable
to this specification and doesn’t change too much relative to the baseline regression, this is
evidence that the effects are not driven by changes in the composition of these individual
time invariant characteristics. As can be seen from row 2 of table 6, they are relatively
stable. The coefficients are slightly lower than the baseline estimates, but relatively close
and still significant at the 0.1% level. This is evidence that the effects we have estimated
so far are not primarily driven by changes in the composition of such unobserved constant
characteristics.
If there are unobserved, time varying covariates that confound our estimates, we could
think that these covariates change more over longer time periods. Therefore, we perform
another robustness check using individual fixed effects on a subsample of the original
sample. Here, we include only the observations from a mother’s first child in the sample,
and thus we relate the changes in a mother’s labor supply when the child goes from 1 to 2
to the changes in the child coverage rate. This leaves less room for changes in time-varying
covariates since we only look at the variation within two subsequent years. As can be
seen from row 3, the estimates are relatively stable to this specification, supporting our
empirical strategy.
Next, we want to investigate whether our estimates could be driven primarily by the
response among urban or rural women. We therefore estimate the baseline regression on
a subsample excluding all women residing in the 4 or 11 largest urban municipalities.32
As can be seen from rows 4 and 5, the estimates are extremely stable to this exclusion
and the effects are almost identical to the baseline estimates. In a similar robustness test,
we can investigate subsamples based on a range of different municipality characteristics
before the expansion to see whether the effects differ between municipality types. The
results of this exercise is reported in table 7 in the appendix. In general, we find very
little differences in response to child care coverage among different municipality types,
supporting our empirical approach.
Because our data is non-experimental, the composition of the treatment and control
groups are not random, and we need to tackle the possibility of self-selection into or out
of treatment. In our case, self-selection problems may arise due to selective migration: If
mothers move to municipalities with large or small changes in coverage rates, our estimates
might be biased. For a thorough treatment of self-selection in non-experimental data, see
for example Blundell and Dias (2000). If mothers who will increase their labor supply
32These are the cities of Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim and Stavanger with more than 100,000 inhabitants
and Fredrikstad, Tromsø, Sandnes, Drammen, Sarpsborg and Skien with more than 50,000.
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move to municipalities with high expansion rates, this will show up in our estimates as
an effect of child care on labor supply, when in reality it is just systematic sorting of
work prone mothers to high expansion municipalities. The selection might also work the
other way: If work prone mothers move to municipalities with high initial coverage, we
already know from section 6.2 that these municipalities expand less. This will dampen
the observed effect of child care on labor supply.
To investigate whether our results are driven by selective migration, we run two specifi-
cation checks. First, we use each mother’s municipality of residence in 2001 to determine
what child care coverage rate she will be subject to throughout the period. This way,
women who move to another municipality will be regarded as if they did not. The results
of this exercise are presented in row 6, and we see that the estimates are slightly lower,
but still definitely significant at the 0.1% level.
Next, we simply drop all women who change municipality of residence some time
during the period. This amounts to roughly 250,000 observations. From row 7 we see
that the estimates are stable to this exclusion as well, lending support to the idea that
the baseline results are not primarily driven by self-selection into high- or low expansion
municipalities.
Underlying our fixed effects method is an assumption that is very similar to the com-
mon trend assumption of Difference in Differences setups: Conditional on the control
variables and with no changes in child care coverage, the municipalities would have fol-
lowed the same trend in labor supply. To investigate whether our results are driven by
differences in underlying trends, we perform two specification checks. First we run a vari-
ant of the baseline regression where we include municipality-specific linear time trends.
This allows for differing trends in labor supply between different municipalities, and thus
weakens the common trend assumption. We run
yikt = αk + τt + γCC
12
kt + θkt+ δu
m
kt + βX it + δZit + ikt (5)
Where θk is the parameter of the linear time trend for municipality k and t is the year
number. This exercise is similar to testing the common trend assumption in a Difference-
in-Difference setup: We estimate the effects of child care only on the deviations from the
municipality-specific trend in labor supply. If the estimates of γ are stable compared to
the baseline estimate, this is evidence that the results we have found so far are not driven
by these omitted linear trends. As can be seen from row 8 in table 6, the estimates are
very robust to this test, and the results are not driven by differences in (linear) trends in
labor supply between municipalities.
Another way to weaken the common trend assumption is to allow for municipality
specific time shocks. However, since our identification comes from the within-municipality
variation in coverage rates, we could no longer identify the effect of the coverage rate if
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we included completely flexible shocks to each municipality each year. Instead, we might
think that there are some characteristics of the municipalities that determine how they
are affected by the yearly shocks. These could be different economic or political structures
that make the municipalities react differently to the shocks. To test for this, we can add
a flexible time shock interacted with a set of municipality indicators from 2001:
yikt = αk + τt + γCC
12
kt +
M∑
m=1
ϕmtVm,k,2001 + δu
m
kt + βX it + δZit + ikt (6)
Where ϕmt is the shock connected to characteristic m in year t. The impact of this
shock for municipality m is propagated through Vm,k,2001, the value of characteristic m
for municipality k in 2001. The total shock to labor supply for a given municipality in a
given year will thus be given by the overall shock τt plus the sum of the shocks through
the M characteristics,
∑M
m=1 ϕmtVm,k,2001.
This approach is very similar to the initial exogeneity test performed in section 6.2,
and we use the same 8 economic, political and geographical characteristics as in the
previous section. Again, stable estimates compared to the baseline regression are signs of
robustness for our empirical strategy. Row 9 reports the results from this exercise, and
again we see that the estimates are very stable, supporting our strategy.
Before summing up the results section, we want to evaluate the total robustness of the
estimate using a placebo analysis. A placebo analysis is a regression designed to be as
similar to the baseline regression as possible, but where the outcome variable cannot be
affected by the explanatory variable. If we nonetheless find significant effects of our ex-
planatory variable on this placebo outcome, this might be a sign of model misspecification
that casts doubt on the estimation strategy.
As placebo outcome, we choose the labor supply of mothers of 3- and 4-year olds.33
These mothers should not be affected by the child care coverage rate for toddlers, as their
youngest child is at least three years old. For mothers of 3-year olds, we run:
yikt = αk + τt + γCC
12
kt + κCC
3
kt + ηCC
12
k,t−1 + δu
m
k,2001 + βX i,2001 + δZi,2001 + ikt (7)
Since these children are subject to the child care for 3-year olds, we include the coverage
rate for these children, CC3kt, as a control variable. We also know from our previous
analysis that there are persistency effects of toddler care, so we also include CCk,t−1, the
mean of the child care coverage rates during the toddler years. We exclude mothers who
have another child or study. As in the persistency analysis, we use covariates from 2001
to minimize the bad control problem. The regression equation for mothers of four year
33We use the same “efficient age” definition as earlier, where children born later than August 31st are
considered one year younger than they actually are.
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olds is equivalent.
Again, the parameter of interest is γ. If we find significant effects of the current toddler
coverage rate on the labor supply of older mothers, conditional on the coverage rate for
older children and the coverage rate during the toddler period, we would worry about
some sort of model misspecification confounding our estimates.
The results of this exercise are reported in row 10 and 11 in table 6. We find effects that
are much smaller than the baseline estimates for both placebo outcomes. The coefficients
are not nearly significant at any conventional level. We find no sign of misspecification of
our model from this placebo test.
To sum up, the battery of robustness tests and placebo controls performed in this
section support the empirical strategy and strengthen our belief that we have found causal
effects of child care coverage on female labor supply.
8 Conclusion
Child care expansion is often consider an important policy tool for reconciling family and
work responsibilities and increasing female labor supply. Economic theory finds support
for a positive relationship between the availability of universal, subsidized child care and
maternal labor supply, but also predicts that a child care reform will crowd out informal
care. The efficiency of child care expansion as a tool to increase female labor supply is
therefore an empirical question.
Although there are readily available empirical research on the efficiency of subsidized
child care on female labor supply, most of this research concern preschoolers. For younger
children, such research is scarce, and there are reasons to believe that the labor supply
response of mothers of toddlers may differ from that of mothers of older children.
A Norwegian child care reform from 2003 that led to large increases in coverage rates
for toddlers provide a natural way to examine the efficiency of a child care expansion
for mothers of these children. The Norwegian market for child care was characterized by
rationing during the period under study, something that is important for our estimation
strategy. Under rationing, changes in demand for child care will not affect the observed
coverage rates until the rationing is lifted. The rationing in the market therefore reduces
problems of reverse causality.
Using a robust fixed effects method, this thesis investigate the efficiency of child care
for toddlers on mothers’ labor supply, finding significant effects on both labor force par-
ticipation and full time equivalent labor supply. We estimate that a full-scale expansion34
of child care for toddlers increases the labor participation of these mothers by around 11
percentage point, or more than 16%. For full time employment, the effects are smaller at
around 5 percentage points, constituting a 13% increase. These effects are significantly
34Going from zero to 100% child care coverage.
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different from zero at any conventional significance level. A battery of specification and
robustness checks support our baseline fixed effects method, supporting of our empirical
approach to finding the causal effect of child care.
This thesis also finds some evidence of persistency in the labor supply response, espe-
cially when considering full-time employment. This suggest that mothers who work more
due to the higher availability of formal care, also work more in the subsequent years,
possibly due to serial correlation in employment or less human capital depreciation. This
is important when considering the efficiency of the reform
Last, we find slight evidence of a reverse response among fathers. Fathers of young
children seem to reduce their labor supply when child care coverage increases, possibly
because the mothers are now working more. This might indicate that child care lead to
better balance in the responsibility for taking care of small children between mothers and
fathers, both in market and household work.
These effects are significantly larger than other estimates from the literature, par-
ticularly Havnes and Mogstad (2011) who find and effect almost half the size from a
very similar reform for older children. There are several possible reasons for this find-
ing. Preferences for child care may have changed over the three decades between the
reforms, and preferences may also differ between mothers of toddlers and preschoolers.
Second the price of informal care from relatives and friends may have changed. Probably
most importantly, however, the alternative mode of care may be different for toddlers
and preschoolers. The findings in this thesis suggest that the alternative mode of care for
toddlers when formal child care is not available is to a larger extent parental care than
informal care. If this is the case, we will observe larger response to child care expansion
for toddlers than preschoolers.
Our results have implications for contemporary political debates on family policies,
welfare reform and gender equality. Even if the estimates are larger than previously found
in the literature, the economic implication is that it takes around 9 slots in child care to
induce one more mother enter the labor market. An important goal of the child care
expansion and the family policies in Norway has been to further gender equality in the
labor market. If the child care reform was enacted only to obtain this goal, the expansion
would have to be regarded as relatively inefficient, given that the price for 9 slots in child
care is very costly to the government in terms of subsidies. Although not the purpose of
this thesis, a cost-benefit analysis of the child care reform would probably find that the
cost of the slight increase in female labor participation is relatively high, and not nearly
covered by the increased tax income from the increases in labor supply.
All in all, the results from this thesis suggest that expansion of child care for toddlers is
a relatively cost-inefficient tool for increasing female labor participation. As Havnes and
Mogstad (2012) find, however, universal child care also strengthens child development,
increases labor market attachment, reduces welfare dependency and increases education
42
and earnings in the long run. If these effects also hold for toddlers, the results from this
thesis suggest that the proponents of universal child care should base their arguments
primarily on the effects on child development rather than female labor supply.
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Table 7: Subsample analysis: Municipality indicators in 2001
Municipality 2 BA 4 BA N
characteristic Big Small Big Small Big Small
Primary share 0.1233*** 0.1030*** 0.0448*** 0.0519*** 106,248 640,693
(0.0221) (0.0126) (0.0176) (0.0114)
0.638 0.671 0.270 0.396
Secondary share 0.1166*** 0.0899*** 0.0715*** 0.0472*** 271,811 475,130
(0.0177) (0.0118) (0.0174) (0.0134)
0.635 0.684 0.303 0.421
Tertiary share 0.0997*** 0.1327*** 0.0495*** 0.0493*** 643,127 103,814
(0.0132) (0.0212) (0.0111) (0.0196)
0.673 0.625 0.396 0.265
Share of female 0.1082*** 0.1025*** 0.0607*** 0.0421** 546,966 199,975
representatives (0.0119) (0.0196) (0.0114) (0.0182)
0.678 0.634 0.409 0.294
Hydropower tax 0.0770*** 0.1281*** 0.0731*** 0.0437*** 264,205 482,736
income (0.0184) (0.0127) (0.0189) (0.0105)
0.673 0.662 0.354 0.390
Female labor 0.1050*** 0.1236*** 0.0621*** 0.0301* 556,306 190,635
force participation (0.0123) (0.0233) (0.0106) (0.0202)
0.682 0.620 0.408 0.288
Unemployment 0.1189*** 0.0989*** 0.0536*** 0.0484*** 492,483 254,458
(0.0138) (0.0153) (0.0124) (0.0176)
0.651 0.695 0.369 0.394
Non-earmarked 0.1520*** 0.0981*** 0.0261 0.0523*** 218,166 528,775
income (0.0224) (0.0147) (0.0205) (0.0147)
0.665 0.667 0.416 0.362
Share of socialist 0.0854*** 0.1161*** 0.0477* 0.0527*** 105,115 641,826
representatives (0.0320) (0.0121) (0.0300) (0.0105)
0.694 0.662 0.374 0.378
Fixed effects regression estimates of γ in (2), in subsamples based on municipality characteristics in
2001. All characteristics are split at the median (among the municipalities), and regressions are
performed separately for mothers in the municipalities above and below the median. The exception is
socialist majority, where the threshold is a majority of the seats in the municipal council, and
hydropower tax income, where the municipalities are split between those who had any hydropower tax
income and those who did not. Municipality-level fixed effects throughout.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality level. Mean of dependent variable
underlined.∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 8: Individual variables used
Variable Description Source
snr_idnr Individual identifier Frisch centre
year Year
wyrkinnt Taxable earnings including self-employment Tax records
komnr Municipality number
sivil Civil status, categorized Demography registers
faar Year of birth Birth records
educ Highest attained education, NUS2000-coded Education registers
g Value of 1 Basic Amount regjeringen.no
immigrant Immigrant status dummy Demography registers
eldresosken Number of older siblings Birth records
educ_otherparent Highest attained education of the father Education registers
bmnth_current Birth month Birth records
oldchild Dummy if the child is in it’s last toddler year. Constructed
iutd Share of the year registered as a student Education registers
ageyoungestchild Age of the mothers youngest child Constructed
eff_ageyougestchild Age of child, -1 if born in September or later Constructed
otherparent_educmiss Dummy if education data is missing Constructed
educmissing Dummy if education of the father is missing Constructed
firstchildinsample Dummy if child is mother’s first in sample Constructed
female_child A dummy if the youngest child is female Birth records
List of individual variables used and their source.
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